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Foreword 
This Research paper is the first of a series we plan to produce annually, taking a 
research topic of significant national interest and considering it not just for 
analytical purposes but for some examples of potential policy implications. The 
content of these papers are designed to be an input into an area of wide research 
applicability — in this case, a contribution to the Australian Government’s next 
Intergenerational Report and the sweeping question of how Australia copes with an 
ageing population. 
The policy issues are carefully chosen to address needs that if not immediate, will 
necessarily be so tomorrow. The intent is that the paper supports an informed 
discussion and leads towards policy thought in anticipation of need, rather than in 
the face of it.   
This paper was produced by a team led by Ralph Lattimore, and included Jared 
Greenville, Andrew Irwin, Tom Nankivell, Hudan Nuch, Peter Varela and Melissa 
Edwards, with useful inputs from Lindsay Fairhead.  
 
 
 
 
Peter Harris 
Chair 
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Overview 
 
Key points 
Australia’s population will both grow strongly and become older. Such slow but 
profound shifts in the nature of a society do not elicit the same scrutiny as immediate 
policy issues. The preferable time to contemplate the implications is while these 
near-inevitable trends are still in their infancy. 
Population ageing is largely a positive outcome, primarily reflecting improved life 
expectancy. A female (male) born in 2012 will on average live for an estimated 94.4 
(91.6) years.  
However, population growth and ageing will affect labour supply, economic output, 
infrastructure requirements and governments’ budgets. 
Australia’s population is projected to rise to around 38 million by 2060, or around 
15 million more than the population in 2012. Sydney and Melbourne can be expected 
to grow by around 3 million each over this period. 
The population aged 75 or more years is expected to rise by 4 million from 2012 to 
2060, increasing from about 6.4 to 14.4 per cent of the population. In 2012, there was 
roughly one person aged 100 years old or more to every 100 babies. By 2060, it is 
projected there will be around 25 such centenarians. 
Total private and public investment requirements over this 50 year period are 
estimated to be more than 5 times the cumulative investment made over the last half 
century, which reveals the importance of an efficient investment environment. 
Labour participation rates are expected to fall from around 65 to 60 per cent from 2012 
to 2060, and overall labour supply per capita to contract by 5 per cent. 
Average labour productivity growth is projected to be around 1.5 per cent per annum 
from 2012-13, well below the high productivity period from 1988-89 to 2003-04. Real 
disposable income per capita is expected to grow at 1.1 per cent per annum compared 
with the average 2.7 per cent annual growth over the last 20 years. 
Collectively, it is projected that Australian governments will face additional pressures 
on their budgets equivalent to around 6 per cent of national GDP by 2060, principally 
reflecting the growth of expenditure on health, aged care and the Age Pension. 
Major impending economic and social changes can create the impetus for new reform 
approaches not currently on the policy horizon. For example: 
• The design of the Age Pension and broader retirement income system might be 
linked to life expectancy after completion of the current transition to 67 years in 2023. 
• Using some of the annual growth in the housing equity of older Australians could 
help ensure higher quality options for aged care services and lower fiscal costs.  
• Wide-ranging health care reforms could improve productivity in the sector that is the 
largest contributor to fiscal pressures. Even modest improvements in this area 
would reduce fiscal pressures significantly.   
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In 2005, the Commission reported that timely action to address the consequences of 
demographic change could avoid the future need for ‘big bang’ policy interventions 
later. Over eight years later, the discussion of the possible opportunities and policy 
challenges presented by an ageing population seems to have waned. The most 
recent Intergenerational Report, which also highlights these issues, is now nearly 
four years old. Even with ever more information on trends, the near inevitability of 
significant fiscal and policy consequences of demographic change seems not to 
have created much genuine desire for reform. Further, recent interventions to 
address the threats posed by global economic events have left Australian 
governments less well placed to handle the effects of ageing than most would have 
expected in initial debates. On top of these factors, Australia is much closer to the 
time when the most significant effects of ageing are likely to be felt.  
Against this background, the Commission has looked afresh at the economic issues 
raised by population ageing. Like any analysis associated with forecasting very long 
term trends, this study is exposed to the charge that it extrapolates in ways that may 
not be representative of reality. The apparent neat precision of any particular 
number is not meant to convey that this shall inevitably be the result, when over a 
50 year period a wide variety of unknown factors will arise. But the existence of 
unknown factors is no basis for not considering the trends, which are the important 
aspect of this analysis. The trends are unmistakable in most cases. They point to the 
need for serious contemplation of future policy measures sooner rather than later.  
How will Australia’s population change over the next 50 years? 
Australia’s population is projected to increase to more than 38 million by 2060, 
more than 15 million above the population in 2012. While significant variations are 
possible around that estimate, it is unlikely that the population would be less than 
34 million or more than 42 million (figure 1). Notwithstanding the large projected 
increase in the population level, population growth rates are projected to fall over 
time, halving from 2012 to 2060.  
The likely population growth will place pressure on Australian cities. All of 
Australia’s major cities are projected to grow substantially. Sydney and Melbourne 
may grow by around 3 million each over the next 50 years (figure 2). In response to 
the significant increase in the size of Australian cities, significant investment in 
transport and other infrastructure is likely to be required. This is true both within the 
cities themselves and for the links between regional and major cities. Policies will 
be needed to reduce congestion problems, and to ensure adequate infrastructure 
funding and investment efficiency.  
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Figure 1 The Australian population will probably grow by around 
15 million over the next 50 years  
End June 2011-12 to 2059-60 
 
Figure 2 Australia’s two biggest cities may exceed 7 million 
Projected city populations, end June 2011-12 and 2059-60 
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While having relatively high rates of immigration and fertility compared with other 
developed economies, Australia’s population will still age dramatically over the 
coming years. The primary ‘culprit’ is a virtuous one — Australians are 
experiencing lower mortality rates and enjoying longer lives (figure 3). Moreover, 
the figures for life expectancy usually quoted by statistical agencies can 
significantly understate people’s actual longevity because they do not take into 
account the likely future reductions in mortality rates as a person ages: 
• Using such ‘cohort’ life expectancies, the life expectancy of a girl born in 2012 
is projected to be more than 94 years and for a boy nearly 92 years.  
• Such cohort life expectancies are particularly useful in considering the length of 
people’s customary retirement periods. Using the usually published life 
expectancies, it might appear that a person born in 2012 could expect to live for 
19 more years after they reach 65 years old. In fact, it is projected that they will 
live for around 29 years after that age. This raises issues about optimal 
retirement ages, provision for publicly funded pensions and rules about access to 
superannuation savings — an issue explored in more detail later. 
Figure 3 Death rates have fallen 
The chance of dying over the next year (%),1921 to 2011 
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more uniform distribution across ages characteristic of a highly aged population 
(figure 4).  
Figure 4 Population ageing until the 22nd century  
Growth rates of the oldest is set to 
dramatically increase over the next 20 years  
The age structure becomes more 
uniformly distributed across ages 
  
Growth rates of the oldest segments of the population will accelerate over the 
coming years, as the baby boomer generation enters old age (figure 4). The number 
of people aged 75 years and over is projected to increase by about 4 million 
between 2012 and 2060 — an increase roughly equivalent to the current population 
of Sydney. The most striking illustration of ageing is the growth in the population of 
people surviving past 100 years of age. In 2012, there was roughly one person aged 
100 years old or more to every 100 babies. By 2060, it is projected that there will be 
around 25 centenarians for every 100 babies, and with continued small increases in 
longevity, by 2100, there will be more people aged 100 or more years than babies 
born in that year. 
Labour supply 
With an aggregate labour force participation rate1 always exceeding 65 per cent, the 
period from 2007–2025 represents a peak in labour market engagement in Australia 
                                              
1 This is the number of people aged 15 years or more who are in, or looking actively for, work, 
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not exceeded since 1914. After 2025, aggregate participation rates gradually fall to 
a projected rate of just below 60 per cent by 2059-60 (figure 5).  
Figure 5 Labour force participation rates 
By age group, per cent 
2012-13 
Participation rates  
are projected to fall 
  
Paradoxically, this is despite the likelihood that in nearly every relevant age group, 
and especially among older Australians, people’s projected engagement in the 
labour force will increase. The reason for the aggregate decline is that, even with 
those age-specific increases, older Australians have much lower participation rates 
than the prime-aged working population (those between 25 and 54 years), with 
population ageing shifting many more into the older age brackets. In fact, were the 
age structure of the population not to change over the next fifty years, aggregate 
labour force participation rates would be expected to rise to more than 68 per cent. 
In the Commission’s analysis, small increases in hours worked per employee and 
falls in unemployment rates over the next 50 years partly offset the effect of lower 
aggregate participation rates on labour supply (best measured as hours worked per 
capita). The only other major factor determining labour supply per capita is the 
declining share of people aged 0-14 years, who are excluded from any count of the 
potential labour force. Given this offsetting influence, overall labour supply per 
capita is projected to fall by nearly 5 per cent by 2059-60 (figure 6).  
While the projected labour force estimates take account of historical trends, they 
may not fully account for two important influences on future labour supply by older 
workers: 
• the future old will be better educated than both previous generations of older 
workers and the future young, reflecting the long-run impacts of the large 
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expansion in tertiary education and the stabilisation of tertiary participation rates 
at younger ages. Higher levels of tertiary education are strongly associated with 
greater labour force participation, and this effect may not be fully reflected in 
historical labour force participation trends 
• there is conflicting evidence on trends in disability rates among older 
Australians. Population surveys of disability suggest rates have been falling, but 
labour market surveys and usage of the Disability Support Pension tell, at best, a 
mixed story. Disability is highly associated with low labour force participation. 
If nothing else, the above evidence suggests an imperative to find out more about 
the real trends in disability rates relevant to people’s engagement in the labour 
market, and to understand the policies that may improve engagement. Current 
policy reforms in disability support should shed light on this over time. 
Figure 6 Contribution to the reduction in hours worked per capita 
100 x change in natural log values, 2012-13 to 2059-60 
  
What about productivity? 
The remaining critical ingredient to future economic growth is productivity, which 
has a greater impact than the reduction in labour supply per capita. Australia’s 
labour and multifactor productivity (MFP) growth has languished in recent years. 
Without broader policy reforms, it appears that it will be difficult to return to the 
higher growth rates experienced in the 1990s. In part, this reflects the structural shift 
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Average labour productivity growth is projected to be around 1.5 per cent per 
annum from 2011-12 to 2059-60 (with multifactor productivity growth contributing 
0.7 percentage points). This is considerably below the estimates used in most 
previous studies of future economic growth. In contrast, prior to the recent 
slowdown, average peak-to-peak labour productivity growth from 1998-99 to 
2003-04 exceeded 1.8 per cent per year. 
Around 0.8 percentage points of the projected annual labour productivity growth 
rate reflects the contribution of capital accumulation. It is projected that the gross 
fixed capital spending (by the private and the public sectors) required to underpin 
capital deepening will be around $38 trillion over the next 50 years in constant 
2011-12 prices. This is around 5 times more than the sum of investment required 
over the previous half century (1959-60 to 2011-12). Given this, it is crucial to have 
economic settings conducive to efficient capital investment and to its financing. 
Increases in productivity growth have sizable impacts on output growth. As an 
illustration, using the Commission’s base case value of labour productivity, the 
cumulative sum of annual GDP values from 2012-13 to 2059-60 is around 
$140 trillion in constant 2011-12 prices. An increase in labour productivity of 
0.3 percentage points a year increases the cumulative value by $13 trillion. This is 
equivalent to around 8 years of Australia’s GDP value in 2012-13. Where the 
improved productivity growth arises from ‘doing things better’ rather than capital 
deepening, this value could support some or all of the very significant expected 
increase in consumption of health, aged care and training services, underlining the 
link between economic and social policy. Australia has instigated important 
programs, such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme, to support people in 
need, and will come under pressure to ensure adequate resourcing of future health 
and aged care services. The income that underpins such social programs needs to be 
created in order to be distributed.  
The implications for economic growth and national incomes 
While the supply-side of the economy is clearly critical to Australia’s future 
prosperity, a country’s standard of living is ultimately dependent on the value of its 
disposable income. This takes account of the terms of trade, transfers to foreigners 
and the need to pay for capital accumulation. The terms of trade is projected to 
decline so that, with the additional impacts of contracting growth rates of labour 
supply and labour productivity, disposable income is projected to grow at a much 
slower rate compared with the boom period from 1993 to 2012 (figure 7).  
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The bottom line is that the combined cocktail of falling labour supply per capita, a 
declining terms of trade and poorer productivity growth rates mean that Australians 
can expect that the growth in disposable income per capita will fall to less than half 
that of the boom years. A period of truly diminished outcomes is likely to be at 
hand, unless luck or appropriate policy initiatives intervene.  
Figure 7 A major slowdown in income growth is impending 
Percentage change in real net national disposable income per capita 
  
Growing fiscal pressures coincide with lower economic growth  
Diminishing economic expectations are likely to coincide with increasing 
expectations for public spending. Australian governments will face major fiscal 
pressures over the ensuing decades. This reflects that government expenditure is 
strongly weighted towards older Australians, and that population ageing will expand 
their relative importance dramatically (figure 8). 
The principal indicator of future fiscal pressure is the degree to which government 
spending outpaces revenue when the ratio of government tax revenue to GDP is 
held constant. This provides a measure of the increase in revenue or reduction in 
aggregate spending required to provide a balanced budget (table 1). Overall, the 
Australian Government must find funding sufficient to cover additional expenditure 
of 4.5 per cent of GDP, and combined state and territory governments must find an 
additional 1.4 per cent of GDP. It is possible that given the limited taxation options 
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available to the states and territories, much of their fiscal pressure could be ‘passed 
on’ to the Australian Government in the form of greater demands on federally 
collected taxes. 
The main sources of such pressures over the next 50 years are likely to be rising 
obligations for publicly-funded health care, aged care and retirement. There is likely 
to be relatively minor fiscal relief from obligations that typically relate to lower age 
groups.  
Figure 8 Age-related government spending 
All governments, $’000 per person, 2011-12 
 
Table 1 Budget pressures grow over the next 50 years 
 2011-12 2059-60 Change 
 Share of GDP (%) Share of GDP (%) Share of GDP (%) 
Australian Government 
Health care 4.1 7.0 2.9 
Age Pension 2.7 3.7 1.0 
Aged Care 0.8 2.6 1.8 
Education 1.9 1.7 -0.2 
Other (including disability) 11.2 10.2 -1.0 
Sum 20.7 25.1 4.5 
State and territory governments 
Health care 2.4 3.8 1.4 
Education 3.5 3.2 -0.3 
Disability 0.2 0.5 0.3 
Sum 6.1 7.5 1.4 
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The pressures on health care, the most important driver of fiscal pressure, reflect 
two related factors: 
• Health care costs rise with age, given greater service use at older ages. For 
example, in 2010-11, the cost of Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme drugs per 
person aged 75 or more years was nearly 50 times greater than the cost per 
person aged under 18 years. Similarly, dramatic relationships between age and 
per person costs are apparent for other health services, such as hospitals 
(figure 9).  
• This pressure is compounded by non-demographic factors that affect costs, such 
as advances in the quality of services, and new technologies. Even for a given 
population age structure, costs per capita in health care tend to rise at around 0.6 
to 0.9 percentage points above real GDP per capita growth, depending on the 
segment of the health care sector.  
Figure 9 Hospital costs by age and sex, 2010-11 
 
The two factors are interlinked because many technological innovations occur for 
health interventions intensively used by older Australians. This trend may be 
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few years, prescription numbers increased more than sixfold, with annual costs to 
government rising from $45 million to nearly $310 million (figure 10). 
Closing the fiscal gap 
All governments face the long-run fiscal reality most bluntly put by the character 
Micawber in Charles Dickens’ novel David Copperfield: ‘Annual income twenty 
pounds, annual expenditure nineteen six, result happiness. Annual income twenty 
pounds, annual expenditure twenty pounds ought and six, result misery’. While 
governments, unlike Micawber, have the capacity to borrow over reasonably 
lengthy periods, neither that strategy nor selling assets purely on revenue raising 
grounds are sustainable long-term options to address the widening fiscal gap. (There 
may of course still be strong efficiency grounds for privatisation.) 
Figure 10 The rising costs of a drug for age-related macular degeneration 
  
Accordingly, governments can respond to long-term pressures only by raising taxes, 
cutting aggregate spending or some hybrid. To give a picture of the size of the 
aggregate funding gap facing all governments, its closure would require that total 
taxes collected by all Australian governments increased from around 28 to 
34 per cent of GDP (about a 21 per cent increase), or roughly an equivalent 
reduction in the existing expenditure to GDP, or some mix of the two. The key issue 
will be how governments can manage to close a gap of this size in an orderly, 
efficient and equitable way. Taxation will inevitably be part of the story, as will be 
targeting of any wasteful or inefficient spending. But some creative options also 
warrant exploration in the policy debate that Australia must have.  
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Some reforms represent opportunities to overcome ageing fiscal 
pressure and warrant further debate 
Increasing workforce participation amongst older workers 
People are living much longer, yet for the last hundred years, there has been little 
change in the age at which people are eligible for the Age Pension or the period 
spent in the labour force (figure 11). The average life expectancy from age 15 years 
of a male born in the so-called ‘Oldest Generation’ between 1901 to 1925 was just 
over 55 years. After age 15 years, he would spend just 13 years (or less than 
25 per cent) of his remaining lifetime outside the labour force. In contrast, it is 
estimated that the male generations born between 2006–2060 (‘GenWhats’) will 
live an additional 78 years once they reach 15 years old, of which 33 years will be 
spent outside the labour force (mostly not in education).  
If time in full-time equivalent work is considered, the average male ‘GenWhat’ 
aged 15 years is projected to work for an estimated 39 years compared with around 
44 years for their ‘Oldest Generation’ counterpart. The additional years in 
retirement appear likely to be mainly healthy ones. 
Figure 11 What is the future of people’s lives once they 
have reached 15 years old? 
Successive male generations 1901 to 2060 
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(though many students still work), greater wealth and savings, and the high value of 
leisure. However, there are several major obstacles to the employment of older 
people, of which the financial incentives of (and the social norms established by) 
the tax, superannuation and pension systems figure prominently.  
Only in recent times has the eligibility age for the Age Pension (and indeed the 
former statutory provision for mandatory retirement) been seen as out of step with 
older people’s greater life expectancy and their capacity to contribute to society 
through paid work. Older Australians are characteristically neither infirm nor inept. 
While the pension age is scheduled to gradually increase to 67 years by 2023 for 
both men and women, an important issue is whether there are grounds to make slow 
and automatic changes to the eligibility age in line with future life expectancy gains 
— a position advocated by the OECD.  
The Age Pension serves a number of purposes and, consequently, it is difficult to 
determine the optimal eligibility age. Nevertheless, increasing the eligibility age in 
line with increases in life expectancy would prima facie have some benefits. As an 
illustration of the impacts of rising pension eligibility ages, gradually increasing the 
pensionable age from 67 to 70 years could:  
• increase participation rates for people in the relevant ages by around 3–10 per 
cent, taking account of the fact that some people would be unable to work (and 
would transfer to the Disability Support Pension), some would be already 
working, and others with sufficient privately-funded superannuation would 
largely not be affected by a change in the publicly-provided pension 
• yield ongoing fiscal savings of around 0.15 per cent of GDP per annum in the 
late 2030s after accounting for some increase in Disability Support Pension 
recipients (and then falling to 0.1 per cent of GDP in the long run). Over the full 
period from 2025-26 to 2059-60, the accumulated (undiscounted) savings would 
be around $150 billion in constant 2011-12 prices. 
There are several complexities in implementing any link between the pensionable 
age and life expectancy, but these are surmountable (as suggested by the operation 
of such links in some countries). Shifts in attitudes and expectations amongst 
employers and the labour force will be important to the effectiveness of any policies 
in this area.  
Aspects of the superannuation system, particularly the taxation arrangements and 
preservation age, also have incentive effects on labour supply and entail taxpayer 
costs of a similar magnitude to those posed by the Age Pension eligibility age. The 
issues raised by growing longevity should be considered for the whole retirement 
income system.  
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Examining new ways to help fund government-provided services 
Among other concerns, affordability has been an obstacle to greater co-contributions 
by older people for the taxpayer-funded services they use. However, many people 
may be able to tap certain assets in innovative ways without compromising their 
current living standards. Many may also wish to contribute if it underpins more 
consumer-directed service delivery and reduces the risk of rationing of services 
central to their wellbeing — such as high quality aged and health care. 
Any future policy debate about the possibility of innovative arrangements for 
greater co-contributions should be informed by facts and analysis.  
Most households and individuals already save for their retirement, consistently 
building wealth over their working lives and then using it to fund their retirement. 
But retirees tend not to draw down the wealth in their home, which represents a 
significant share of their total wealth (figure 12). Over 80 per cent of older 
households own their home, overwhelmingly without any mortgage. Even those on 
the Age Pension often fully own their own home. Evidence on bequests over the 
past ten years, which most commonly relate to the family home, suggests this trend 
is continuing. 
Figure 12 Older Australians are often income poor but asset rich 
2009-10 
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services could reduce government expenditures by around 30 per cent (a 
conservative estimate). An equity release scheme of this kind would still leave older 
households with an appreciating asset base and provide a means to increase the 
quality of services provided over the longer term.  
The viability of any such scheme depends on many other matters, but the evidence 
suggests that further investigation is warranted. 
Productivity reforms in health care delivery 
Improvements in the productivity of the health sector and more efficient allocation 
of resources would generally help directly reduce fiscal pressures and, in some 
cases, improve outcomes for people (such as by avoiding adverse hospital 
outcomes).  
The evidence suggests that there are significant variations in the productivity of 
different health service providers, providing scope for productivity improvements 
from shifting the performance of laggards. In Australia, for example, a study found 
that there were around 200 procedures where the cost can vary from half to around 
one-and-a-half times the average cost, depending on the hospital undertaking the 
procedure.  
Productivity improving reform can be instituted at an organisational or 
governmental level (such as funding initiatives, or coordinating databases of clinical 
evidence).  
An illustration of organisational reform at the point of service delivery is the 
application of ‘lean’ care models, which apply to hospital care some of the 
management techniques used in modern logistics. As an example, one hospital 
found that the major source of delays or cancellation of surgery was a bottleneck in 
just one link of the chain — the post-anaesthesia (and surgery) care unit. Instead of 
just providing more beds at that point, the usual response to a bottleneck, hospital 
management managed the flow of patients into the care unit from areas providing 
anaesthesia, resolving the bottleneck without more resources.  
More broadly, across the whole health system, decisions about what resources to 
use, for whom and when, are informed by a messy assortment of sound evidence, 
and information that is out of date or not well founded. In the United Kingdom, 
frustration with the costs of poorly founded practices led to the development of 
so-called ‘do not do’ lists, which identified health care practices that were not cost 
effective. The basic infrastructure for evidence-based practices already exists — 
such as through the international Cochrane collaboration, and the practices of 
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bodies like Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee and the United 
Kingdom’s National Institute for Clinical Evidence. However, diffusing the results 
of such evidence has proved more difficult, indicating that there may need to be 
complementary reforms to incentives and institutional arrangements.  
Of course, effective preventive and early intervention may avoid the use of costly 
procedures at a later time (or simply the avoidance of poor outcomes) — the 
principle behind public health. Many adverse health outcomes — examples cover 
areas such as those arising from accident trauma, lung cancer, cardiovascular 
disease, diabetes and illicit drug use — can benefit from preventative approaches. 
Nevertheless, while it is likely that many prevention strategies are warranted and 
effective, crafting cost-effective prevention strategies is not straightforward, as 
reflected, for example, in the case of obesity prevention. The analytical methods 
used to establish cost-effectiveness need improvement if they are to make a 
significant contribution to the health reform agenda.  
There are several other well-known and promising areas for reforms that may lead 
to improvements in both productivity and cost effectiveness. These have often been 
frustrated by problems in implementation (such as the divided responsibility for, 
and structure of, associated funding) or the actions of interest groups adversely 
affected by them. The potential reform areas include: 
• Workforce demarcation and regulation: current arrangements likely inhibit more 
efficient skill mixes and create unnecessary regulatory burdens.  
• Procurement in the health sector: particularly in hospitals, increased purchasing 
power could be leveraged by aggregating some purchases, and achieving 
efficiencies in the purchasing process itself. 
• Financial and regulatory incentives: regulation of the health sector and 
differentiated health funding can distort choices between procedures, and 
providers (such as emergency departments and general practitioners). The split 
in funding responsibilities between levels of government can contribute to this 
issue. 
However, as with all significant policy change, careful consideration and analysis of 
the policies, and the best manner of implementation, is warranted. 
Estimates of the benefits from some recent health reforms suggest that these could 
bring significant benefits and help to alleviate fiscal pressures. Just a 5 per cent 
improvement in health sector productivity would reduce the projected fiscal 
pressures for all Australian governments by 0.5 percentage points of GDP in 
2059-60.  
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Planning for the future 
Population ageing is a desirable side product of success. All highly-developed 
countries have longer life expectancy and lower fertility rates than poor countries. 
However, population ageing entails major economic and social transformation for 
Australia at a time when it is likely that the terms of trade reverts to its lower 
long-term average and productivity growth rates fall below the historical norm. 
Growth rates in output and income per capita are likely to slow, while increased 
demands on governments to fund age-related expenditure will generate fiscal 
pressures. Any cyclical downturns will add to these pressures. 
The preferable time to contemplate the policy implications of these developments is 
while these near-inescapable trends are still in their infancy. 
